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The Missing Link between Self-Determination and
Democracy: The Case of East Timor
Hua Fan*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Even though the right to self-determination has only “vague and imprecise”
“meaning and content,”1 it has been invoked by numerous groups 2 as a vehicle to achieve
various ends, the majority of which relate to freedom. 3 Alternatively, these groups may
achieve greater freedom by pressing for democracy. 4 The relationship between selfdetermination and democracy is complex. On the one hand, democracy may be an
alternative to self-determination, i.e. a minority or unrepresented people may attain equal
rights with the majority or the represented and thus become “self- governing” through a
struggle for democracy. In this way the attainment of democracy may eliminate the need
for pursuing self-determination. 5 On the other hand, democracy may be a component of
self-determination. In the Wilsonian formulation, self-determination includes an internal
aspect of democracy, because, as self-rule, self-determination “implies meaningful
participation in the process of government.”6 This aspect of self-determination is
commonly referred to as “internal self-determination.”7
*
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1
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27 (rev. ed. 1996).
2
See, e.g., Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age,
32 STAN . J. INT ’L L. 255, 258-59 (1996) (“The right to self-determination is invoked in international law
more often than any other collective human rights. . . . At a political level, it is proclaimed by, and on
behalf of, non-state populations as diverse as the Kurds, the Quebecois, the Basques, the Scots, the
Palestinians, the East Timorese and the Tamils.”).
3
See, e.g., id. at 286 (listing various “interpretations and results of movements in the name of selfdetermination”, including “the West European search for union, indigenous demands for autonomy,
feminist claims to participation, liberal theories of democracy or internal self-determination, reunification
agreements, the criminalization of colonial domination, declarations on partial sovereignty, and the
reconstruction of failed states, . . .[e]ven secession. . .”).
4
According to Amartya Sen, democracy entails “voting and respect for election results, . . . , the protection
of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and
uncensored distribution of news and fair comment.” Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J.
DEMOCRACY 3, 9 (1999). This comment will follow this concept of democracy.
5
See Simpson, supra note 2, at 279 (“The Kantian view . . . envisages a federation of sovereign states in
which each state holds regular, public, universal, and free elections. In this way, each person is secured his
or her right to personal political self-determination.”).
6
HANNUM, supra note 1, at 30.
7
M ORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW W ORLD ORDER 17 (1992). In contrast,
external self-determination represents the idea that people have the right to free from external coercion or
alien domination. Id. See also Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise
of Democracy?, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT 'L L. 601, 617 (2003) (“[T]he external dimension or aspect [of
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However, internal self-determination was disregarded from the beginning of the
modern concept of self-determination. 8 Only in the post-decolonization era did the
international community begin to recognize the importance of internal selfdetermination. 9 In 1990, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
explicitly associated internal self-determination with Western-style democracy. 10 In the
final days before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the European
Community and the United States openly conditioned their recognition of the republics of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on the realization of the internal self-determination of
their peoples. 11 All the republics of the Soviet Union and four of the six Yugoslav
republics accepted such a condition and gained recognition of the international
community soon after. 12
However, the United Nations (“U.N.”) failed to emphasize internal selfdetermination in its intervention in the self-determination efforts of East Timor. The
U.N. granted East Timor independence from Indonesia and then carried out an expensive
nation-building mission there. 13 However, the U.N. civil authority in East Timor was not
representative of, or accountable to, the East Timorese people and could be characterized
as “benevolent despotism.”14 In addition, East Timor’s political leaders built “few bonds
with average [East] Timorese” and made decisions with little interaction with the
self-determination] defines the status of a people in relation to another people, State or Empire, whereas the
democratic or internal dimension [of self-determination] should concern the relationship between a people
and its own State or government.” (quoting Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of SelfDetermination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in M ODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101
(Christian Tomuschat ed.,1993))).
8
The states created after First World War “undertook no specific obligation to ensure a democratic form of
government” save for “various minority guarantees.” HANNUM , supra note 1, at 30. In the de-colonization
era, “between 1945 and 1979, seventy territories achieved independence without regard to the nature of the
relationship between the governing institutions of the newly independent states and the people over which
they exercised their sovereign authority.” Miller, supra note 7 at 622 (quoting A NTONIO CASSESE , SELFDETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 339 (1995)).
9
Miller, supra note 7, at 624.
10
Id.
11
See id.; Halperin, supra note 7, at 27-38 (describing international community’s reaction to the breakup of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). Four days after the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus declared the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States designated the commitment to democratic political
process as one of the basic principles for its overall approach to the self-determination claims of the Soviet
republics. Id. at 31. Soon after, the European Community announced that to gain its recognition, the
republics of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia would have to “respect the provisions of the U.N.
Charter, Helsinki Final Act, and Charter of Paris, particularly with regard to the rule of law, democracy and
human rights.” Id. at 33.
12
Id. at 30-31, 35-37. The four of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the
“SFRY”) that accepted the conditions of the United States and the European Community and gained their
recognition were Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Id. at 35. The remaining two
republics, Serbia and Montenegro, formed a new federation of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which “regarded the disintegration of the SFRY as a process of serial secession” and “claimed
to be the exclusive legal and political continuator of the SFRY.” Carsten Stahn, The Agreement on
Succession Issues of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 96 A M. J. INT ’L L. 379, 379-80
(2002).
13
Joel C. Beauvais, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J.
INT ’L L. & POL. 1101, 1102-04 (2001); Jane Perlez, Ramos-Horta is Appointed New Premier of East Timor,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at 14 (“ Several billion dollars in international aid was spent to help East Timor
build its own army, police force and judicial system, and on the United Nations peacekeeping force that
came to East Timor after a vote in favor of independence in 1999.”).
14
Beauvais, supra note 13, at 1114.
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people. 15 Although East Timor has shown some remarkable improvements since the end
of Indonesian occupation, 16 its people actually became poorer, especially after the U.N.
downsized its mission. 17 Months before the U.N.’s planned end of its nation-building
mission, the newborn state descended into chaos again. 18 Four years after its
independence, people were still “asking whether East Timor ha[d] any future at all as an
independent nation.”19
This article uses the East Timor case to illustrate the importance of the link
between self-determination and democracy. Built upon the notion that only democracy
validates governance, 20 it argues that democracy is an indispensable complement for selfdetermination, and offers three reasons. First, only through popular participation can the
will of the “self,” i.e. the will of a group of people that is entitled to self-determination,
be ascertained. Second, the right to democracy is the natural bridge between selfdetermination as a group right and the well- being of individual group members. Only
through democratic process can any individual meaningfully participate in the realization
of self-determination. Third, only democracy can minimize the transaction costs
associated with self-determination and make it an efficient outcome for the society.
Part II of this Article provides some background information on the selfdetermination movement of East Timor and the recent outbreak of violence in the spring
of 2006. Part III reviews international scholars’ discourses on the relationship between
democracy and self-determination and argues that their approval or disapproval of the
right to self-determination correlates with their understanding of the relationship between
democracy and self-determination. In turn, Part IV through VI discusses how democracy
can ascertain the true will of a group, individualize the right to self-determination, and
make self-determination an efficient outcome. Part VII concludes.
II. EAST TIMOR : BACKGROUND

¶6

The island of Timor was divided into East and West Timor by the Portuguese and
Dutch colonists. 21 When West Timor gained independence from the Netherlands as part
of Indonesia in 1949, East Timor remained a Portuguese colony. 22 After Portugal became
a democracy in 1974, it accelerated the decolonization of East Timor 23 and evacuated its

15

Joshua Kurlantzick, The U.N. Success Story That Wasn’t, W ASH. POST , June 4, 2006, at B4.
Id.
17
Jane Perlez, Poverty and Violence Sink Grand Plans for East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006, at A3.
18
Jane Perlez, East Timor’s Capital Spirals into Violence, Despite U.N. Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2006, at 16.
19
Jane Perlez, A Nation-Building Project Comes Apart in East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A3.
20
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 A M. J. INT ’L L. 46, 46-49
(1992).
21
Herbert D. Bowman, Letting the Big Fish Get Away: the United Nations Justice Effort in East Timor, 18
EMORY INT ’L L. REV. 371, 374 (2004).
22
Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the International Court of
Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT ’L & COMP . L. REV. 323, 324 (1993-1994). In 1960 the United Nations
recognized East Timor as a non-self-governing territory with the right to self-determination and granted
Portugal the administrating power of East Timor. Roger S. Clark, East Timor, Indonesia, and the
International Community, 14 TEMP . INT ’L & COMP . L. J. 75, 78 (2000).
23
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON , INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : LAW , POLITICS,
M ORALS: TEXT AND M ATERIAL 673 (2000).
16
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forces from East Timor in August 1975. 24 In the subsequent power vacuum came a civil
war among pro-Portuguese, pro-Indonesia, and pro- independence forces. 25 The proindependence party won the war 26 and announced the independence of East Timor in
November 1975, while the other East Timor political parties announced East Timor’s
integration with Indonesia. 27 In December 1975, the Indonesian army invaded East
Timor and took substantial control of the territory. 28
Under the military regime of President Suharto, Indonesia formally integrated East
Timor in July 1976. 29 This move met with strong disapproval from the international
community. The U.N. condemned the illegal invasion and repeatedly requested
Indonesia’s withdrawal. 30 On the ground, armed resistance continued to challenge
Indonesia’s effective control. 31 Nevertheless, Indonesia stood firm on its position until
Suharto stepped down in May 1998. 32 His successor, President Habibie, proposed a grant
of special autonomy to East Timor in June 1998. 33 Much negotiation ensued. 34 In May
1999, Indonesia, Portugal and the U.N. signed agreements authorizing the U.N. to help
the East Timorese choose between autonomy and independence via a popular
consultation (the “1999 Agreements”). 35 In August 1999, at the popular consultation
conducted by the United Nations Mission to East Timor (“UNAMET”), 78.5% of those
who voted disfavored the autonomy proposal36 despite intimidation by the pro-Indonesia
militias. 37 The international community read this as a clear expression of the will of East
Timorese for separation from Indonesia. 38
Displeased by this result, the pro-Indonesia militias, with the acquiescence and
even support of the Indonesia n military, “launched a massive campaign of violence.”39
The escalation in violence led the U.N. to authorize a multinational force to restore peace
and security in East Timor in September 1999. 40 The violence also resulted in the
departure of Indonesian civil administrators from East Timor. 41 In October 1999, the

24

HALPERIN, supra note 7, at 136.
Id. Both the pro-Portuguese party, the Democratic Union of East Timor (“UDT”), and the proindependence party, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (“FRETILIN”), sought
eventual independence. However, UDT “favored a transitional period,” in which Portugal would keep
participating in the governance of East Timor, while FRETILIN called form immediate independence.
Jennifer Toole, A False Sense of Security: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Organization and
Conduct Mission in East Timor, 16 A M. U. INT ’L L. REV. 199, 207 (2000).
26
Clark, supra note 22, at 79.
27
Jani Purnawanty, Various Perspectives in Understanding the East Timor Crisis, 14 TEMP . INT ’L & COMP .
L. J. 61, 65 (2000); Toole, supra note 25, at 208.
28
Clark, supra note 22, at 79.
29
Purnawanty, supra note 27, at 61.
30
Id. Additionally, the U.N. continued to regard Portugal as East Timor’s administrative power. Id.
31
Id. See also Clark, supra note 22, at 79.
32
Purnawanty, supra note 27, at 61.
33
Id. at 66.
34
Id. See also Toole, supra note 25, at 214-15.
35
Purnawanty, supra note 27, at 66-67.
36
Id.
37
Toole, supra note 25, at 215.
38
Purnawanty, supra note 27, at 67.
39
Toole, supra note 33, at 204, 216.
40
STEINER & A LSTON , supra note 23, at 674.
41
Mark Rothert, U.N. Intervention in East Timor, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 257, 261 (2000).
25

179

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

¶9

[2007

Indonesia n legislature formally recognized the result of the popular consultation42 and
repealed the legislation that decla red East Timor a province of Indonesia. 43 The
Indonesian military withdrew the last of its personnel in late October. 44 In the same
month the U.N. set up the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(“UNTAET”) to administer East Timor during its transition to independence, 45 with a
mandate to exercise all legislative and executive powers in East Timor, including the
administration of justice. 46
Under U.N. administration, East Timor adopted a Constitution, 47 which “provides
for a unitary democratic State, based on the rule of law and the principle of separation of
powers.”48 East Timor became an independent country on May 20, 2002. 49 The U.N.
then ended the UNTAET mandate and established the United Nations Mission of Support
in East Timor (“UNMISET”) to continue its nation-building assistance in East Timor. 50
After three years of service, UNMISET was downsized and renamed the United Nations
Office in Timor Leste (“UNOTIL”), which had a mandate to carry out peace-building
activities until May 19, 2006. 51 The international community had regarded East Timor’s
nation-building since the popular consultation as a success story until the spring of
2006.52 Among the major achievements in East Timor were peaceful politics, a
functioning civil society and the foundations of a vibrant economy. 53 However, several
problems gradually became salient. First, the country’s political leaders “built few bonds
with average [East] Timorese” and were unresponsive to the needs of the people. 54
Second, the leaders relied on their personalities, rather than institution-building, to solve
the problems their country faced. 55 Third, the leaders had the country’s international
relations take priority over domestic issues. 56 Fourth, with an already weak private
sector, the leaders failed to provide enough public-works programs to counter the U.N.
mission’s downsizing and resulting cut in local jobs. 57 Fifth, the ethnic conflicts among
people from different parts of the country, especially between the military and police,
gradually intensified. 58
42

STEINER & A LSTON , supra note 23, at 674.
Clark, supra note 22, at 85.
44
Id.
45
STEINER & A LSTON , supra note 23, at 674.
46
Carla Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the United
Nations in East Timor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 628 (2002).
47
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor, ¶4, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/432 (Apr. 17, 2002).
48
Id. at ¶5.
49
Jane Perlez, Impoverished East Timor Exults Over Independence, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2002, at A6.
50
S.C. Res. 1410, ¶1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002).
51
S.C. Res. 1599, ¶1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1599 (Apr. 28, 2005).
52
Kurlantzick, supra note 15. As an example of this reliance on the personality of leaders, the president,
Xanana Gusmao, visited many military officials to ask them to cool off after the rumors of a possible fight
among soldiers spread out in March 2006, without the government addressing the core demand of the
soldiers. Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Perlez, supra note 17; Emily Messner & J.J. Messner, A Lesson in How Not to Leave, W ASH. POST , June
10, 2006, at A19.
58
Perlez, supra note 17. See also, Alan Sipress, In. E. Timor, an Optimistic Enterprise Turns to Ashes,
43
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When East Timor built its armed forces, the soldiers from the anti-Indonesia
guerrillas, who came mostly from the easternmost part of the country, took the senior
positions, while the lower ranks were recruited from the western part of the country. 59
Meanwhile, the police mainly consisted of people who served as policemen during
Indonesian occupation, 60 with its senior officers mostly coming from the western part of
the territory. 61 The guerrilla-turned- military personnel hated the ex-Indonesian police
officers. 62 The U.N.’s favoritism towards the police exacerbated the situation. 63 In
January 2006, about 400 soldiers from the western part of the country complained about
ethnic discrimination and poor treatment. 64 Their complaints ignored, the western
soldiers took to the streets in February 2006. 65 Rather than addressing the grievances, the
military fired nearly 600 westerners, or about 40% of the armed forces, and nearly all of
its western members in March 2006. 66 The dismissed soldiers staged another
demonstration in late April 2006. 67 This protest led to clashes among dismissed soldiers,
the soldiers loyal to the government, and the police, 68 which in turn provoked conflicts
between gangs of easterners and westerners. 69 The conflicts escalated into May 2006. 70
Unable to contain the extensive violence, the government called in an Australia-led
force. 71 Accused of “form[ing] a hit squad to kill his political opponents,” the Prime
Minister Mari Alkatiri resigned in June 2006. 72 The crisis was considered by some as
“the worst” since 1999 and as a “serious setback” to the U.N.’s nation-building efforts in
East Timor. 73 Before delving into the implication of this crisis with regard to the
understanding of the integral link between democracy and self-determination, the next
section will review relevant literature.
III. DEMOCRACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION : FRIEND OR FOE

¶11

The relationship between democracy and self-determination has received
significant academic attention. Thomas M. Franck argues that the right to selfdetermination evolved from “a principle of exclusion” to “one of inclusion” (the right to
“free, fair and open participation” in the democratic governance of each state). 74 He
regards self-determination as a building block of democratic entitlement, his notion that
W ASH. POST , June 2, 2006, at A13; Jane Perlez, Australian Forces in Timor Capital to Deter Warring
Sides, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at A7.
59
Sipress, supra note 58.
60
Kurlantzick, supra note 15.
61
Sipress, supra note 58.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Alan Sipress, E. Timor Premier Bows to Pressure, Submits Resignation – Alkatiri Allegedly Formed
Death Squad, W ASH. POST , June 27, 2006, at A17.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Franck, supra note 20, at 46, 59.
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only democracy validates governance, 75 and sees reciprocity between democracy and
self-determination. Self-determination is “the historic root from which the democratic
entitlement grew.”76 On the other hand, since self-determination is implemented
selectively, it lacks coherence and must merge with other components of democratic
entitlement to increase its legitimacy. 77 He envisions that “collective international
processes” will let democracy become a “global entitlement.”78
¶12
Amitai Etzioni is not so optimistic about self-determination’s capacity of advancing
democracy. He believes that “with rare exceptions,” self-determination movements
actually “undermine the potential for democratic development in non-democratic
countries and threaten the foundations of democracy in democratic ones.”79 He argues
that, historically, the moral approval self-determination movements enjoyed was based on
the belief that self-determination would bring more responsive and democratic
government to the oppressed minority people. 80 He proposes that only those selfdetermination movements that will enhance democracy be supported. 81
¶13
Unlike Franck or Etzioni, who both ignore the variability of democracy, Russell A.
Miller’s assessment of self-determination relies on the same concept of democracy that
the self-determination movement uses. He argues that what Franck sees as a strong link
between democracy and self-determination is actually “limited to the common use of
majority rule plebiscites and referendums in the process by which states have achieved
self-determination.”82 Behind this guise of democracy often hides ethnic-nationalism,
which has led to the creation of numerous undemocratic states in the names of fulfilling
democratic ideals by self-determination. 83 Miller proposes to free democracy from the
usurpation of ethnic-nationalism so that self-determination will not lead to the “demise of
democracy.”84 He ultimately believes that, with an emphasis on internal selfdetermination and an enriched concept of democracy, self-determination movements can
bring about the advancement of democracy. 85
¶14
Whereas Franck, Etzioni and Miller evaluate self-determination based on its effects
on democracy, Gerry J. Simpson worries that democracy cannot meet the diverse needs
of those who seek to self-determine. 86 Simpson argues that the purpose of the right to
self-determination is “to protect the collective human and democratic rights of minorities
and unrepresented peoples.”87 Simpson doubts that the group self-determination can “be
satisfied by the majoritarian model, even in the presence of minority rights.”88 Simpson’s
mistake is that he equates democracy with mere majority rule and fails to appreciate the

75

Id. at 46, 52.
Id. at 52.
77
Id. at 86.
78
Id. at 46.
79
Amitai Etzioni, The Evils of Self-Determination, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y 21, 21 (1992-1993).
80
Id. at 35.
81
Id. at 21.
82
Miller, supra note 7, at 610.
83
Id. at 608, 610, 633
84
Id. at 647.
85
Id.
86
Simpson, supra note 2, at 280.
87
Id. at 258.
88
Id. at 279.
76
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full potential of democracy. As Miller suggests, “nearly all” Western democracies have
“abandoned or opted against winner-take-all, majority rule system of representation.”89
¶15
Just as Simpson argues that democracy is insufficient to protect the democratic
rights of minorities, 90 Amy E. Eckert claims that “[t]o promote democracy as the only
legitimate result of self-determination” fails to satisfy “the requirements of liberal
democracy,”91 because the right to self-determination demands a free determination of
political status, but the right to democracy entails a determination to be free. 92 She
alleges that Franck confuses the means of self-determination with a particular end. 93 To
equate self-determination with “one particular political outcome,” democracy or any
other, “misconstrues the content of self-determination,” because “[m]andating that a
people must determine to be free . . . significantly constrains their right to” selfdetermination. 94 Therefore, “the right to democracy is not equivalent to selfdetermination.”95 Eckert concludes that “a people could freely choose to organize itself
undemocratically,” “[a]s long as the determination itself is freely made,” and that such a
determination “must receive the same respect as a determination to be free.”96
¶16
The problem with Eckert’s reasoning is that nothing in self-determination implies
that it can only be exercised once and for all. To what extent can one generation’s
decision bind the future generations? What if a people decide not to be free and then
change their minds in four years? Do they still have the right to revise their political
status? In a sense, every electorate in every liberal democracy periodically chooses not to
be free by electing a set of people to hold public offices for a fixed term. The need to
have repeated and unconstrained exercise of the right to free determination necessarily
leads to the determination to be free. Democracy may not be as irrelevant or
incompatible to self-determination as Eckert supposes.
¶17
As discussed above, scholars’ attitudes towards self-determination correlate with
their understanding about the link between self-determination and democracy. On the
one hand, Franck, Etzioni and Miller evaluate self-determination from the perspective of
democracy. While Franck promotes self-determination as an integral part of democratic
entitlement and Etzioni denounces self-determination for damaging the advancement of
democracy, Miller tries to reconcile the two by differentiating democracy. On the other
hand, Simpson and Eckert appraise democracy in light of the need for self-determination.
Simpson argues that democracy is inadequate for self-determination, while Eckert
suggests democracy is irrelevant to self-determination. Their disassociation of
democracy from self-determination contributes to their ambivalence toward the latter.
However, their arguments are untenable as Simpson oversimplifies democracy and
Eckert misconstrues self-determination. Therefore, this article further investigates
Franck’s perception of the integral link between self-determination and democracy
through empirical study and ultimately finds strong support for it. The next section will
89

Miller, supra note 7, at 639.
Simpson, supra note 2, at 258.
91
Amy E. Eckert, Free Determination or the Determination to be Free? Self Determination and the
Democratic Entitlement, 4 UCLA J. INT ’L L. & FOREIGN A FF. 55, 78 (1999).
92
Id. at 62.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 57.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 71.
90
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use the case of East Timor to illustrate why true self-determination should start from
ascertaining the will of the “self” through democratic means.
IV. DEMOCRACY, SELF, AND DETERMINATION
¶18

Most discussions of self-determination begin with an attempt to break the concept
into what is the “self” and what is “determination”. 97 The first step, the identification of a
“self” (a group of people entitled to self-determination), includes both an objective
element (whether the group has “certain objectively determinable common
characteristics”) and a subjective element (whether the group considers itself
“distinctive”). 98 Although this identification usually is a difficult task, 99 it is somewhat
easier in the case of East Timor. Objectively, East Timor is geographically separate from
Portugal, and East Timorese are ethnically different from Portuguese; thus, the U.N.
recognized East Timor as a non-self- governing territory with the right to selfdetermination in 1960. 100 Subjectively, East Timor’s self-awareness may be established
by its prolonged resistance throughout Indonesian occupation and eventual vote to
separate from Indonesia. This led the U.N. to reaffirm its recognition that East Timor had
the right to self-determination after Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor 101 and to
ultimately grant East Timor independence.
¶19
A feature of the establishment and maintenance of East Timorese as a “self” with
the right to self-determination relates to the disconnection between the objective and the
subjective elements of a distinctive East Timorese people. The East Timorese’s objective
uniqueness was validated vis-à-vis the Portuguese, 102 while their subjective selfawareness was established vis-à-vis the Indonesians. In other words, among the two
elements necessary to establish the existence of an East Timorese people distinct from
Indonesians, the objective element was carried over from the East Timorese’s geographic
separateness and ethnic difference from the Portuguese, which they no longer had vis-àvis the West Timorese. Surely it would not be impossible to establish an objective
distinction between East and West Timorese. But the point here is that this objective
element is simply taken as a given, even though it led to a decision affecting the lives of
all East Timorese.
¶20
This disconnect leads to two problems. First, the maintenance of East Timorese in
1999 as the same “self” as East Timorese in 1960 overemphasized the country’s colonial
origin at the expense of its more recent history. Like the Indonesians, the Portuguese
came uninvited and maintained a repressive regime in East Timor. 103 As a result, the East
Timorese asked for, and the U.N. recognized, their right to self-determination from
97

HANNUM, supra note 1, at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
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Id. at 31.
100
Clark, supra note 22, at 78.
101
Id. at 78, 81.
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Throughout Portugal’s colonial control, East Timorese nationalist groups demanded independence.
Purnawanty, supra note 27, at 63. This may serve as evidence that East Timorese people regarded
themselves as a distinctive group vis -à-vis the Portuguese. Therefore, before the Portuguese evacuated
themselves in 1975, both the objective and subject distinctiveness of East Timorese was well-established
vis -à-vis Portuguese. However, as argued below, it is problematic to have the objective distinctiveness
simply carried over to later generations of East Timorese.
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Portuga l. However, the East Timorese people in 1999, although direct descendants of
East Timorese in 1960, were arguably a different group of people as they now speak
Indonesian. 104 Further, they are now divided into easterners and westerners, with
westerners less antagonistic toward Indonesian occupation. 105 However, they are still
recognized as the same “self” as their forefathers. This bequest limited the new
generation’s freedom of choice and tilted the population’s will toward independence.
This arguably also contributed to the pro-Indonesia militias’ violent behavior.
¶21
Second, the maintenance of the East Timorese in 1999 as the same “self” as East
Timorese in 1960 unduly eliminated the right of any sub- groups of East Timorese to the
right to self-determinatio n. In 1960, any differences within East Timorese were dwarfed
by their difference from the Portuguese and they were more resolute in seeking
independence. 106 However, the intra-group differences became more salient as East
Timorese’s differences from Indonesians were much smaller and different groups had
dissimilar attitudes towards Indonesia. The dilemma that one group’s exercise of the
right to self-determination may deny another group the same right thus became a bigger
problem. In view of these two problems, a fresh exercise in determining their objective
distinctiveness before the 1999 popular consultation may well have helped the East
Timorese discover who they are, what they share with the Indonesians, and what
differentiates them. Such reflection could have helped them make a more informed
decision.
¶22
After the identification of a “self,” the next step is to decide what and how to
“determine.” Per the 1999 Agreements, the future of East Timor was decided by East
Timorese people through a popular consultation in the form of a universal, direct and
secret ballot organized and conducted by the U.N.107 However, Miller suggests that the
“rigid use of the majority rule, self-determination referendum is an example of . . .
‘institutional fetishism,’”108 and could not serve as the “democratic” element of a selfdetermination. 109 He argues that this might be because in Western democracies “winnertake-all, majority decisions are radically circumscribed” out of a concern about the
“tyranny of the majority,” while in self-determination referendums this consideration is
ignored. 110 In East Timor’s case, there is evidence of what Miller calls the “ethnonationalist and inherently undemocratic repercussions”111 of the referendum. The
political leaders inaugurated upon independence remained distant from the people and
relied more on personalities than institutions to govern. 112 The Prime Minister Mari
Alkatiri “changed the rules on voting” of his political party to suppress intra-party
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Kurlantzick, supra note 15.
See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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criticism, “passed a law making defama tion” a serious crime, 113 and “was accused of
forming a hit squad to kill his political opponents.”114
¶23
The use of the referendum as a self-determination device had several other
problems. First, the popular consultation was organized and conducted by an alien
organization within only two months 115 in a largely illiterate society116 with no democratic
legacy. The short time frame limited the East Timorese’s participation in the process.
They hardly had time to have orderly debate about the pros and cons of either choice and
to persuade each other. This promoted simplistic and confrontational interpretations.
The two months’ time also ruled out any give-and-take between Indonesia and East
Timor on the condition of the autonomy. Second, this arrangement put too much stake in
a single vote and thus encouraged pro-Indonesia militias to use violence to intimidate
East Timorese. If the decision to separate had been made gradually in a series of events
over a longer period, the pro-Indonesia forces may well have diverted their resources to
political campaigning. However, left with a referendum in two months, they may have
found the threat of violence to be a shortcut. Third, the referendum encouraged people
who merely sought to change the status quo to vote for separation because the ballot
offered only two choices, autonomy or independence.
¶24
The anatomy of “self” and “determine” in the context of East Timor illustrates the
importance of democracy in ascertaining the meaning of these two concepts in any selfdetermination movement. In identifying a “self,” democracy requires that the subjective
and objective elements of the required distinction match each other because a people’s
preference cannot be established through the expression of another. In deciding the
manner of “determine,” democracy emphasizes the process by which the preferences of
the members of the people are mapped onto the collective preference of the group. Here
majority referendum is not enough. The people must have the opportunity to freely
participate, scrutinize their options, and persuade themselves and each other. Only
through an unconditional acceptance of these requirements of democracy can the true will
of a people be ascertained. The next section will turn to the question of how democracy
can bridge the group right of self-determination and the right of individuals.
V. SELF-DETERMINATION AS A GROUP RIGHT
¶25

Self-determination is a right of “peoples.”117 No matter how “peoples” are defined,
they must be collectivities consisting of more than one individual. 118 James A. Graff
asserts that one’s view of the right to self-determination depends ultimately on how one
understands “the relations between the rights of collectivities and the rights of individuals
who comprise them.”119 He finds that in reality the “tendency to think and talk about
113

Kurlantzick, supra note 15.
Niniek Karmini, E. Timor Premier Sworn In, W ASH. POST , June 10, 2006, at A11.
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The U.N. mission organizing and conducting the popular consultation was established on June 11, 1999
and the East Timorese voted on August 30, 1999. See Toole, supra note 25, at 215; Rothert, supra note 41,
at 260.
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(Judith Baker ed., 1994).
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peoples as if they were individuals” is central to the right of self-determination. 120 In the
case of East Timor, the maintenance of the East Timorese people in 1999 as the same
“self” as those in 1960, discussed in the previous section, is clearly an example of
treating an abstract collectivity as if it were “a clearly identifiable, single spatiotemporal
agent.”121
¶26
Three other features of the U.N.’s nation-building efforts in East Timor confirm
that the U.N. regarded self-determination as a right belonging to an abstract “East
Timorese people” rather than to any living East Timorese.
¶27
First, if self-determination is regarded as a collective right independent of the rights
of any individuals that constitute this group, there would be less incentive to consult any
of the individuals in the implementation of this right, so long as the right is implemented
in good faith for the benefit of this abstract “group.” Therefore, although UNTAET was
“charged with preparing the East Timorese for democratic self- government,”122 it
operated “in an autocratic manner itself” 123 or, as its head Special Representative Sergio
Vieira de Mello put it, “by means of a style of ‘benevolent despotism.’”124 U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1272, in establishing UNTAET, did not provide for local
participation in the transitional administration directly or through freely chosen
representatives. 125 Although it did require UNTAET to “consult and cooperate closely
with the East Timorese people,” “sustained criticism suggests that UNTAET’s
‘consultation’” through the two local advisory bodies it appointed “was cursory rather
than genuine.”126 The lack of local participation may explain why UNTAET ignored
those issues most pressing for local East Timorese. For example, “[a]lthough most East
Timorese are dirt-poor farmers” and the productivity of the rural economy “is the lowest
in Asia, . . . little effort was made to improve basic agriculture during the United Nations
administration.”127
¶28
Second, if self-determination is regarded as a right belonging to an abstract group
above and beyond any individual member of this group, there would be less incentive to
make its implementation accountable to any of the individuals. This may be why
UNTAET regarded itself as “immune from local jurisdiction,”128 and chose to follow the
custom that “[the] international staff of the U.N. mission [wa]s immune from prosecution
in the country of deployment,”129 even though the usual justification for such immunity,
i.e. “functional necessity, ” did not apply in East Timor. 130 Under this immunity
120
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126
Bongiorno, supra note 46, at 657.
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Wilde, supra note 123, at 456.
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UNTAET personnel committed human right abuses, including arbitrary detention. 131
This deficit of accountability may have undermined, by setting a precedent for
“unaccountable, centralized and autocratic” governance in East Timor, UNTAET’s own
objective of preparing East Timor for democratic self- government. 132 In addition, it may
also have resulted in local people’s perception that accountability applies only to them,
but not to the U.N. officials, which ma y create the impression that the U.N. mission is “a
paternalistic, imperialist endeavor.”133
¶29
Third, if self-determination is regarded as a collective right that belongs to a group
with a much longer lifespan than any individual member of the group, there would be less
incentive to prioritize the realization of this right over other more visible short-term
duties. Thus, UNTAET’s nation-building efforts emphasized the minimization of “shortterm risk of failure” and the maximization of “short-term visible gains” over the “longterm strategic objective of preparing the East Timorese for democratic selfgovernment.”134 From its beginning, UNTAET found a fundamental tension between its
two mandates—administrating East Timor and preparing it for self- government. 135
Although the U.N. administration of East Timor was “not an end in itself, but a means to
achieve . . . East Timorese self- government,” UNTAET’s “initial approach was biased
heavily toward the short-term goals associated with” the U.N. administration and
“effectively deprioritiz[ed] the move toward independent East Timorese statehood.”136
Under intense pressure from the East Timorese, UNTAET gradually switched gears to
focus more on preparation for East Timorese self- government. 137 However, whether this
shift was authentic or symbolic is still in dispute. 138 The emphasis on U.N. administration
and the inadequacy of UNTAET’s preparation for East Timorese self- government may
explain why East Timor was a success story under UNTAET’s administration and
UNMISET’s cons iderable assistance to East Timorese government, but then returned to
chaos soon after the largely ineffective UNOTIL began to help.
¶30
The problems with the U.N.’s treatment of East Timor’s right to self-determination
as a group right without regard to the individual rights of East Timorese demonstrate the
importance of justifying the group right to self-determination by the rights of individuals
and implementing the right to self-determination with the welfare of each individual in
mind. The conception that the right to self-determination belongs to an abstract “people”
is a fiction. 139 The East Timor case further illustrates the potential of democracy to link
the group right to self-determination with the rights and well-beings of individuals. Graff
argues that if individuals are to be treated as equal and their human rights honored, the
group right of self-determination must ultimately give way to a wide range of
“democratic, political and legal rights” of the individuals. 140 This suggests that an
individua l’s democratic rights should serve as the bridge between self-determination and
131
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the rights of individuals. To become the true beneficiary of self-determination, each and
every East Timorese must be consulted and afforded the opportunity to actively
participate in the implementation of self-determination. The implementation must be
made accountable to them and sufficient priority must be given to the capacity-building
for their self- government. Such participation and accountability requirements naturally
demand that democracy serve as the bridge between self-determination as a group right
and the rights of those individuals that constitute the group. The next section will discuss
how democracy can make self-determination an efficient outcome for those who seek it
using economic analysis.
VI. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE COASE THEOREM
¶31

Self-determination has a huge impact upon the welfare of countries. Some of them,
such as South Korea, have achieved substantial economic growth since independence. 141
Others, such as India, may have eliminated famine thanks to an independent statehood. 142
However, economics, a powerful tool for many other legal questions, has yet to be
applied to self-determination. 143 This section will try to fill in that gap by examining selfdetermination by applying the Coase Theorem.
¶32
The Coase Theorem provides that if property rights are well-defined and
transactions are costless, among the many competing uses of a property the most
productive use will ultimately prevail, no matter what the initial allocation of a property
right may be. 144 Daron Acemoglu examines an extension of the Coase Theorem to the
political field, i.e. the proposition that regardless of the allocation of political powers, the
141

In terms of international Geary-Khamis dollars of 1990, South Korea’s per capita income had grown
from $770 to $12,152 between 1950 and 2001. Daron Acemoglu, Why not a Political Coase Theorem?
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in terms of 1985 dollars. Susan M. Collins, Barry P. Bosworth, Dani Rodrik, Economic Growth in East
Asia: Accumulation versus Assimilation, 1996 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. A CTIVITY 135, 136 (1996).
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policies and institutions ultimately established in a society under these powers should be
the most efficient ones given the diverse needs of the society. 145 He rejects this Political
Coast Theorem (“PCT”) because, while the Coase Theorem relies on enforceable
contracts, the “inherent commitment problems associated with political powers” destroy
the enforceability of contracts between the state and the citizens. 146
¶33
According to the PCT, the exercise of the right to self-determination, like any other
political or economic transaction, should lead to the best outcome given the various needs
and preferences of the society. 147 Suppose that self-determination, by enabling East
Timorese to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and culture development,”148 increases their wealth149 by $6 billion but decreases
that of Indonesia by $4.5 billion. 150 If East Timor has an enforceable right to selfdetermination, it will go forward and use it. If instead Indonesia has sovereignty over
East Timor, East Timor will offer to pay, and Indonesia will accept, an amount between
$4.5 and $6 billion, and both will be better off. Likewise, if self-determination is actually
not a good idea for East Timor and will increase the wealth of East Timorese by $4.5
billion, but decrease that of Indonesia by $6 billion, Indonesia will either (1) hold on if it
initially has the sovereignty over East Timor, or (2) pay between $4.5 and $6 billion to
get the sovereignty over East Timor if it initially does not have it. No matter where the
sovereignty of East Timor initially stayed, it will end up with the party who has the more
productive use for it.
¶34
But this kind of transaction has never happened. Instead, Indonesia chose to spend
a large amount of resources maintaining its occupation of East Timor151 and East Timor
145
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EFFICIENT 3 (1995).
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ECONOMICS 439 (2006). Utility captures the subjective dimension of what people pursue. On the other
hand, it is more straightforward to assign a dollar amount to wealth and compare the wealth that different
people have. In the case of self-determination, peoples may attach huge subjective value to an independent
statehood or whatever other political status they may prefer. However, how much welfare improvement or
other economic benefits self-determinate may bring to people depends on many circumstantial factors and
is therefore more objective. In view of this, the section chooses to use “wealth” to develop the PCT
analysis of self-determination. In addition, the wealth increase here should be understood as the net
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These numbers, 6 billions and 4.5 billion, are arbitrarily chosen here to exemplify a different value of
the territory of East Timor to East Timorese as compared to the value Indonesians attach to the territory.
Although arbitrary, they may not be totally out of scale. The GDP of East Timor, using the purchasing
power parity method, was estimated to be around 370 million U.S. dollars in 2004. CENT . INTELLIGENCE
A GENCY, THE W ORLD FACTBOOK 2006 (2006), available at
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tt.html. The real GDP growth rate in 2005 was
estimated at 1.8%. Id. Assume that the opportunity cost of capital is 10%, the value of a perpetuity
consisting of East Timor’s future GDP’s would be about $4.5 billion U.S. dollars. If East Timor were able
to double its real growth rate once they became more proficient in self-governing, the value of the
perpetuity would be about $5.8 billion U.S. dollars.
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Indonesia had spent $832 million U.S. dollar to develop East Timor during its occupation of the latter.
Purnawanty, supra note 27, at 69. Maintaining a troop in East Timor was not cheap either. For example,
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suffered tremendously from its strife against Indonesia 152 until Indonesia withdrew after
the U.N.-sponsored popular consultation. 153 This appears to be an outcome inefficient to
both parties. One potential explanation for this is what Acemoglu labels as modified
PCT.154 This modification tries to save PCT by arguing that political leaders may hold
different beliefs about which political actions lead to the best outcome for the society. 155
Therefore, the leaders of Indonesia may have thought that the value of East Timor was $9
billion when the true value was $4.5 billion. They insisted on retaining the sovereignty
of East Timor because they thought they could make more productive use of it.
However, Acemoglu argues that the difference in beliefs cannot sufficiently rationalize
the inefficient outcome when the leaders have maintained the inefficiency for an
extended period. 156 Even if the Indonesian leaders asserted their initial claim over East
Timor out of mistaken beliefs, they had two decades to update their beliefs and change
their inefficient policies. Their steadfastness indicates that the modified PCT cannot
explain their behaviors.
¶35
Acemoglu instead suggests that such sustained inefficiency might be explicated by
a social conflict theory (“SCT”). According to this theory, political decision- makers
choose policies and institutions to maximize their own benefits, rather than the aggregate
welfare of the society. 157 Indeed, the Indonesian leader behind the invasion and
occupation of East Timor, Mohamed Suharto, 158 has been listed as the world’s most
corrupt leader. 159 Some observers even claim that the established investments in East
Timor from the families of Suharto and certain elites in the Indonesian military are the
true reason that Indonesia’s military was involved in the post-referendum violence. 160
Acemoglu further proposes that, under SCT, political elites do not corrupt efficiently
because of the inherent commitment problem attached to political powers. 161 If one were
to put Acemoglu’s theory into practice, Suharto could have used his authority to strike a
deal with East Timor and put the amount East Timor would be willing to pay for
Indonesia spent $2.25 million U.S. dollars on “routine armed forces expenditure in East Timor” in the fiscal
year 1977-78 alone. George J. Aditjondro, Prospects for Development in East Timor after the Capture of
Xanana Gusmao, in International Law and the Question of East Timor 50, 54 (CIIR/IPJET ed., 1995). In
addition, the current President of East Timor, Xanana Gusmao, once estimated that between 25,000 and
30,000 Indonesian soldiers had died in East Timor. Id.
152
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population, died as a result of the fighting between Indonesian military and East Timor resistance.
Bongiorno, supra note 46, at 625.
153
See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
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159
TRANSPARENCY INT ’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2004 1 (2004), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/global_corruption_report__1/download_gcr/download_gcr_2004
. Transparency International alleged that Suharto embezzled between $15 to 35 billion U.S. dollars during
his 31 years’ rule of Indonesia, when the GDP per capita of his country was less than $700 U.S. dollars. Id.
This is far more than what most other dictators siphoned off from their countries. Ferdinand Marcos,
regarded as the second most corrupt leader by Transparency International, looted between $5 to 10 billion
U.S. dollars during his 14 years’ rule of the Philippines. Id.
160
Purnawanty, supra note 27, at 67-68.
161
Acemoglu, supra note 141, at 622. If political elite were to corrupt efficiently, it would “make a deal
with the rest of the society to choose the policies and institutions that maximize output or social welfare,
and then redistribute part of the gains to themselves.” Id.
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independence into his own pocket. If such a deal had gone through, it could have led to
an outcome as efficient for the East Timorese as if they paid the Indonesian treasury.
Such a deal did not happen because it was not enforceable. Suharto could not commit to
granting East Timor independence, because as the dictator of Indonesia he could easily
renege after receiving a bribe. On the other hand, Suharto also had reason to doubt
whether East Timorese would make the payments if he first granted them independence
and thus lost control of them.
¶36
The international community did not provide alternative enforcement mechanisms
sufficient for the prevalence of an efficient outcome in East Timor either, although the
U.N. has provided enforcement assistance to other kinds of state-citizen commitments. 162
Before the U.N.’s enforcement of the 1999 Agreements, it limited its role in the
resolution of the East Timor question to that of a mediator and almost entirely delegated
that task to Portugal. 163 As it turned out, the Portuguese, as ex-colonists, failed to bring
enough credibility to the table, and the implementation of the 1999 Agreements still
needed the U.N. to supervise. 164 On the other hand, the international community’s
selectivity in implementing the right to self-determination brought ambiguity and
uncertainty to that right. 165 This destroyed a prerequisite for PCT, as well as the Coase
Theorem, i.e. a well-defined legal right, 166 and further exacerbated the problem.
¶37
Acemoglu suggests that autocratic leaders might solve the commitment problem by
democratization because by giving up power they could gain credibility. 167 Douglass C.
North and Barry R. Weingast demonstrate how “the fundamental institutions of
representative government emerging out of the Glorious Revolution” made the English
Crown’s commitment to honor its debts creditable and therefore significantly improved
its ability to borrow. 168 These, if applied to East Timor’s self-determination, would
suggest that democratization of Indonesia would solve the commitment problem of
Indonesian leaders and would more likely lead to an efficient solution of the East Timor
question. This was precisely what happened. After Suharto stepped down, Habibie, who
initiated Indonesia’s transition to democracy, 169 proposed granting special autonomy to
East Timor within a month and later agreed to let East Timorese decide their future by
referendum to relieve Indonesia of the heavy political and economic burden of East
Timor. 170 Besides solving the commitment problem, democracy guarantees the free
162
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discussion and distribution of information and “helps society to form its values and
priorities.”171 Therefore, under democracy, Indonesians and East Timorese could more
easily discover the most efficient solution of the East Timor question. This would
promote the mutual understanding between the two peoples and reduce the risk of violent
conflict.
¶38
The end of autocracy in Indonesia led to the secession of East Timor.
Unfortunately, for East Timor, an independent statehood did not signify the end of
inefficiency. Since being in power, the political leaders of East Timor have set up many
seemingly unproductive policies. First, the leaders chose Portuguese as the official
language, even though only 5% of the population speaks it; most East Timorese speak
Indonesian, and the local language is Tetum. 172 As a result, East Timor had to import
hundreds of eleme ntary school teachers from Portugal. 173 Choosing Portuguese as the
official language also impeded the establishment of a functioning judiciary, as few local
judges were proficient in Portuguese. 174 Second, the leaders set the fee for registering a
business higher than the annual per capita income of $370, which discouraged private
enterprise. 175 Third, the leaders built an army not to provide self-defense, but to create
jobs for the ex- freedom fighters and to prevent them from joining the militia. 176 This was
seen as a “fatal flaw” in East Timor’s nation-building177 and eventually led to the riot in
2006.178 Again, only democracy could bring efficient policies and institutions to East
Timor as an independent state. Donald A. Wittman argues that in democracies “political
entrepreneurs are rewarded for efficient behavior” and that “democratic political
markets” are efficient 179 because “[d]emocratic political markets are structured to reduce
transaction costs” and low transaction costs bring efficiency. 180 Although East Timor is a
democratic state under its Constitution, it is very young and still suffers from the
undemocratic elements it inherited from its preexistence as a Portuguese colony and an
Indonesian province. 181 Only through further nation-building and democratic
consolidation can it begin to reap the efficiency that democracy may provide.
¶39
In sum, self-determination has significant instrumental value to societies besides its
intrinsic value for peoples. 182 An economic analysis of East Timor’s self-determination
171
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Perlez, supra note 19.
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Perlez, supra note 17. Economists generally see such high entry barrier as inefficient. Acemoglu, supra
note 141, at 627-28. In comparison, “the total cost of opening a medium-size business in the United States
is less than 2 percent of GDP per capita in 1999.” Id. at 628.
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Perlez, supra note 19.
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Concept and Content, 32 EUROPEAN ECON. REVIEW 269, 270 (1988). Under this conception, the intrinsic
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and beyond shows that self-determination alone does not necessarily lead to improvement
in social welfare, but that democracy can help. Before self-determination, democracy can
solve the commitment problem that may obstruct the political elite from instituting
efficient policies regarding self-determination claims. Democracy can also help people
discover the best outcome for themselves. After self-determination, democracy can
reduce the transaction costs of political actions in the new state and bring efficiency to its
policies and institutions. Additionally, self-determination’s potential for confrontation or
even armed conflicts makes the synergy of democracy and self-determination all the
more imperative.
VII.

CONCLUSION

¶40

This article demonstrates the enormous value-adding potential of democracy to the
right to self-determination through the case study of East Timor. First, democracy can
help identify: (1) whether a group qualifies for the right to self-determination by better
ascertaining its members’ subjective beliefs and matching those with its objective
distinctiveness; and (2) whether and how a group wants to exercise that right by better
aggregating the individual preferences to a collective choice. Second, democracy can
better deliver and individualize the group right of self- determination and ensure that the
respect for the rights and well-being of each individual serves as a guiding principle for
the implementation of self-determination. Third, democracy can augment the
instrumental value of self-determination and promote more efficient policies and
institutions, both during self-determination by discerning whether self-determination is
welfare- improving and after the entrenchment of the new political status by reducing
political transaction costs. Dozens of self-determination movements have been achieved
without any pressure for democracy, 183 but democracy is the force that elevates selfdetermination into something truly appealing.
¶41
This, however, does not imply that democracy is always secondary to selfdetermination or that democracy is only the second best thing that a people can hope for
with regard to the protection of human rights. Independent statehood is not necessarily
the best vehicle to protect the rights and interests of minority peoples. The cases of
Belgium and Switzerland show that a “truly democratic state” must be responsive to any
minority groups and be capable of preserving separate “culture, tradition, religion, or
language.”184 A larger society is more conducive to pluralism because it is more likely to
have multiple social cleavages that cut a higher share of the population into minorities.
In such a setting, the commitment from any group in power to protect the minority rights
is more credible because any member of the group in power may find itself likely to be a
minority in the future. For example, the East Timorese may have allied with the
Acehnese and Irian Jayan, 185 or Indonesia’s religious minorities, such as the atheists, 186 to
existence of the intrinsic value of self-determination and argues for a more balanced approach to the two
values with regard to self-determination, i.e. to take one into sufficient consideration when trying to
maximize the other. Of course, if the intrinsic value of self-determination does not exist, the argument of
this article that self-determination should be engineered so as to maximize its instrumental values will be
even stronger.
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gain equal rights for all minorities. On the other hand, self-determination has put into
power some of the most predatory and oppressive regimes in recent history. 187 Thus,
democracy should not give way to self- determination or wait until after selfdetermination.
¶42
In conclusion, there is a strong link between democracy and self-determination, as
demonstrated by the pre- and post- independence experiences of East Timor. Democracy
is the catalyst for self-determination to bring about the advancement of human rights and
the improvement of the general welfa re of societies. To fully contribute its benefits, selfdetermination must be implemented strictly according to the requirements of democracy.
Only then will the full potential of self-determination be unleashed, in East Timor and
beyond.
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